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STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE:
AN APPRAISAL AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
PAUL J. HARTMANt
A. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF COMMERCE CLAUSE PROTECTION
As long as there are independent federal and state govern-
ments there will remain questions as to their appropriate rela-
tions with each other. The maintenance and promotion of the
national interest in commerce among the states and at the same
time bringing that interest into an effective harmony with the
local interests of the states is one of the continuing problems in
any federal system. The need for national economic unity un-
affected by state borders and untrammeled by discriminatory and
retaliatory state action against commerce from sister states was
one of the chief reasons for abandonment of the Articles of Con-
federation and the adoption of our Federal Constitution, by
which Congress was entrusted with power to regulate interstate
commerce., The removal of trade barriers erected by the states,
both regulatory and tax measures, has evoked repeated and
strong appeals to this fundamental reason for the adoption of the
Constitution. Each new means of interstate transportation and
communication has engendered commerce clause controversy rel-
ative to the taxing power of the states. If one state, in order to
t Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. See THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 7, 11, 22 (Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST, No.
42 (Madison); 1 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 106-118(2d ed. 1888); 2. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
308 (Rev. ed. 1937); 3 id. 478, 547-48; MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 10, 11 (1920) ; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 445 (U.S.
1848); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 445 (U.S. 1827).
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promote the economic welfare of her citizens, may guard them
against competition from a sister state by the taxing process, the
door has been opened to reprisals that were meant to be averted
by subjecting commerce among states to the power of the nation.
In our federal system, however, there must be an appraisal and
accommodation of the competing constitutional demands of the
nation that commerce between the states shall not be unduly im-
peded by state action, and that the power of the states to lay
taxes for the maintenance of their governments shall not be un-
duly curtailed. Whether the impediment to harmful state action
springs from the commerce clause itself, or whether it has been
found in the "will" of Congress, 2 to the Supreme Court of the
United States has fallen the delicate duty to hold "with a steady
and even hand the balance" 3 between these great conflicting de-
mands of the states and nation. Although at times over a mili-
tant and persistent dissent,4 it is now settled that the commerce
clause, without implementation by Congress, limits the power of
the states to tax.
In its zeal to preserve an unfettered flow of interstate com-
merce, during most of our constitutional history, including the
present, the predominant doctrinal declaration of the Court has
2. Under one view that has had some recognition, no prohibition to state
action was found to inhere in the commerce clause itself, but an impediment
to state action might arise from the implied "will" of Congress. The failure
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce was taken by the Court to
signify a congressional purpose to leave undisturbed the authority of the
states to take action affecting the commerce in matters of peculiarly local
concern. State action concerning a phase of the commerce requiring uniform
control would be invalidated, because of a presumed congressional negative,
even if Congress had not acted. See Philadelphia & Southern S.S. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 336 (1887); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing
District, 120 U.S. 489, 493 (1887). This operative will of Congress doctrine
also found acceptance in the field of state regulatory measures, as well as
in taxation. Leisy v. Hardin," 135 U.S. 100 (1890). For a general discussion
of the effect of the "silence of Congress," see Sholley, The Negative Implica-
tions of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. OF Cur. L. REV. 556, 583 (1936).
3. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 82 (U.S. 1872).
4. During various periods sharp debate has divided members of the Court
as to the judicial function under the commerce clause. Chief Justice Taney
apparently was the first member to advocate a judicial "hands-off" policy
in the absence of a conflict of state action with congressional legislation.
See License Cases, 5 How. 504, 579 (U.S. 1846). In modern times Justice
Black has taken up the cudgel to oppose judicial action on state action in
the absence of discrimination against interstate commerce. See, e.g., Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938) (dissenting opinion). For a
while Justices Frankfurter and Douglas were in the same camp with
Justice Black. See McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176,
183 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
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been an adherence to the philosophy that interstate commerce
cannot be taxed at all by the states.5 This view of constitutional
power has been considered as a corollary of the proposition that
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is exclu-
sive.6 Justice Marshall's thinking, of course, is the fountainhead
of this philosophy." To him the "nature of the power" given to
Congress was such as to make it exclusive.
There have been periods, however, when the Court has de-
parted from the view of the exclusive nature of the power of
Congress to control interstate commerce, particularly as to regu-
latory matters, and has followed the views of Chief Justice
Taney, which reached fruition in a modified form in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens." Taney, who was Marshall's successor, stood
at the other extreme from Marshall. In the absence of a conflict
of a state law with congressional legislation Taney thought there
was no function for the Court to perform with respect to laws
interfering with interstate commerce.9 The Cooley doctrine was
to the effect that the nature of the subjects should be the pole star
by which to steer in determining the validity of state action as it
affects interstate commerce. Looking to the subject of the power
as determinative, the Cooley doctrine permitted state and nation
to deal with the same subjects. Accordingly, the followers of this
view conceived of a "concurrent" power in the Federal Govern-
ment and states to regulate interstate commerce. Those facets of
interstate commerce requiring uniform control came within the
exclusive province of Congress, but the states would have con-
current power with Congress over those aspects of interstate
5. Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 537 (1951);
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1946); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290
U.S. 1 (1933) ; Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252 (1929) ;
Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 562 (1925); Kansas City,
F.S. & M. Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227, 231 (1916); Stockyard v. Morgan, 185
U.S. 27, 37 (1902) ; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289, 308 (1894) ; Lyng
v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161, 166 (1890); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S.
640, 648 (1888); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489,
497 (1887).
6. See, e.g., Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888).
7. In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U.S. 1827), Chief Justice Mar-
shall all but committed the Court to the view that the commerce clause
impliedly prohibits all state taxation of interstate commerce, just as there
was a "total failure" of power in the states to tax the operations of a federal
instrumentality, as declared in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S.
1819). In Brown v. Maryland, the McCulloch doctrine was brought over and
declared to be "entirely applicable" to state taxation of interstate commerce.
8. 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
9. License Cases, 5 How. 504, 579 (U.S. 1846).
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commerce adapted to a diversity of control.' The Cooley ap-
proach suggested, in resolving the commerce clause controversy,
the necessity for the weighing of the advancement of local inter-
ests as against interference with national interests. This was a
job for the courts to do. Too, it is evident from the Cooley doc-
trine that the Court had ceased to look to the exclusive "nature
of the power" as Marshall conceived of the grant of power to
Congress to regulate commerce; instead, the Court began to look
to that upon which the power operated-the "subjects of the
power." The essence of the judicial search shifted from the
nature of the power to the target at which the legislative arrow
was shot. The concurrent power theory has been much easier to
state than to apply to any particular state action. The Court has
gotten itself into considerable difficulty at times trying to decide
whether a particular phase of the commerce lent itself to con-
current control or whether it was of such nature as to demand
exclusive congressional control."
The dispute between the two great schools of constitutional
doctrine as to whether the power of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce is "exclusive" or "concurrnt" was, by and large,
a battle of words since even the view holding to the "exclusive"
power conceded that state action could very materially affect the
commerce. The possession of the commerce power by Congress
has never been deemed to cut the states off from all legislative
relation to interstate commerce, even though the state action
unavoidably involved some interference with interstate com-
merce. Ever since Marshall's day it has been recognized, even
by the Justices who thought the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce is "exclusive," that, in the absence of con-
flicting action by Congress, there is power in the states to pass
10. E.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761
(1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938). The Cooley doctrine divided the subjects of interstate
commerce into essentially the same categories as the implied "will" of Con-
gress doctrine. The Cooley doctrine found the impediment to state action
in the commerce clause itself, whereas the operative will of Congress view
found the impediment in the supposed intention of Congress. See note 2
supra.
11. Although the Court has been committed to the Cooley doctrine during
various periods, much less certain or established have been the considera-
tions by which the Court determined which branch of that doctrine to apply
in a particular case. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power,
27 VA. L. RExv. 1, 10 (1940).
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statutes to safeguard their people from injurious local effects
that may attend interstate traffic, which nevertheless in some
measure affect interstate commerce. 12
In the field of taxation there are, of course, many valid taxes
upon local events whose burdens, when distributed through the
play of economic forces, suppress or curtail interstate commerce
to an extent equal to a prohibited exaction imposed directly upon
the commerce itself. They have, nevertheless, been sustained un-
der even the "exclusive" power view, although interstate activ-
ity was induced or occasioned by the taxed event, and however
drastic the consequences on interstate commerce, with the Court
taking the position that such state action was neither taxation of
interstate commerce nor a regulation of it. The exactions were
upheld on the ground that they were levied on a "local incident"
or "local activity," or that the burden of the tax on the commerce
was "indirect" or "incidental."' ' "No doubt every tax upon per-
sonal property, or upon occupations, business, or franchises, af-
fects more or less the subjects, and the operations of commerce.
Yet it is not everything that affects commerce that amounts to a
regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.' 4 Gen-
erally, the economic consequences of a tax have not been thought
by the Court to be of any significance in determining whether the
tax was proscribed by the commerce clause.'15 At intervals that
have been entirely too infrequent, some consideration has been
given to the economic burden in deciding the commerce clause
12. See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 524-25 (1912); Asbell v. Kansas,
209 U.S. 251, 255 (1908); Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 473
(1894). Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U.S. 1829)
is, of course, the historic example. There Chief Justice Marshall recognized
the existence of the reserved power of the states to provide for such local
matters as the safety, health and morals of their own people (th6 police
power), which was thought by him to coexist with the commerce power of
Congress. In the effort to accomplish those proper purposes, Marshall
would permit the states to enact statutes which necessarily would impinge
on the conduct of interstate commerce; but, under his understanding of the
term "to regulate" this did not involve state regulation of interstate com-
merce.
13. Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935); Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919). Compare Eastern Air
Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147 (1932), wit&
Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). See McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), for a comprehen-
sive treatment of this point.
14. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, 293 (U.S. 1872).
15. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 177-78 (1939);
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 217 (1925).
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question. 16 In determining what constitutes interstate commerce
for tax purposes the Court has concerned itself primarily with
such matters as when interstate movement begins, when it ends
and what constitutes an interruption. 17 The tests resorted to by
the Court have thus been mechanical. 8 Economic similarity as an
exclusive test of constitutionality of a tax would make pertinent
precedents out of many cases otherwise in conflict with each
other. 9
The doctrinal declaration of the division of subjects of inter-
state commerce into those demanding national and those admit-
ting of state control, which evolved in the Cooley case as a com-
promise of the views of Marshall and Taney, have continued
much in evidence in the regulatory field of state action but have
appeared much less often in tax cases. In the tax opinions the
Court has talked much more often in terms of the exclusive
power of Congress over interstate commerce. As a result, the
Court has employed a dual standard of constitutionality much of
the time. When regulatory measures have been contested the
Court generally has spoken in terms of the "concurrent" power
of Congress and the states over interstate commerce; and at the
same time, when a tax measure was before the Court, it spoke in
16. See United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918);
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 494-96 (1887). As
we presently will see, under the guidance of Justice Stone the Court gave
more attention to the economic consequences of the tax.
17. See RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 192 (1937).
18. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360 (1943), where the Court rec-
ognizes the mechanical nature of the test.
19. Striking examples supporting this proposition can be found in the
sales and use tax cases. In Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S.
245 (1929), the Court nullified as a direct burden on commerce an attempt
by the state to levy a tax on the consumption of gasoline by an instrumen-
tality engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. On the other hand, a
sales tax imposed on gasoline used by airplanes that operated only in inter-
state commerce was upheld in Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina
Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147 (1932). The Court thought the burden of the
sales tax on interstate commerce was innocuously incidental. There is, of
course, a difference in the sales and use tax in that the sales tax occurred
at a stage more removed from interstate movement than the use tax. Thus,
from a time or geographical standpoint the sales tax is not so closely con-
nected with the subsequent interstate movement as is the use tax on articles
used in that movement. But from a dollars and cents viewpoint it would
seem that the two taxes would have an equal effect on the interstate com-
merce, since the burden of the sales tax was passed on to the consumer.
Concerning the tests of constitutionality, Professor Powell of Harvard has
remarked that "names were made to matter more than mathematics or eco-
nomics." See Powell, More Ado about Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARv. L.
REv. 501, 503 (1947).
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terms of the "exclusive" power of Congress, and generally has
declared that there is no local power to tax interstate commerce.20
That odd dual standard is employed by our present Court.2 1 By
using this curious dichotomy the Court may have been implying
that the states can impinge upon interstate commerce more by
the police power than by the taxing power. The 1946 pronounce-
ment by the Court in Freeman v. Hewit22 let it be known, without
equivocation, that the present Court considers that the states can
do much more that hampers or constricts the flow of interstate
commerce under their regulatory powerg than under the taxing
power.
It is a bit difficult to understand how the Court finds a basis in
the commerce clause to warrant this double standard of constitu-
tionality. What is there in the commerce clause that justifies the
Court's deciding that the states have a concurrent power with
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but, at the same time,
concluding that the commerce clause forbids state taxation of
interstate commerce?
Whatever the nature of the protection from taxation the com-
merce clause has afforded, it has not been limited to the actual
20. Thus, covering the period from the middle 1880's until around the
middle 1930's, the Court uniformly declared that interstate commerce could
not be taxed at all, because the power of Congress over the commerce is
exclusive. The following cases illustrate this approach: Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887); Lyng v. Michigan, 135
U.S. 161, 166 (1890); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 58-59 (1891);
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289, 308 (1894); Stockard v. Morgan, 185
U.S. 27, 37 (1902); Kansas City, F.S. & M. Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227,
231 (1916); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 562 (1925);
Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252 (1929); Minnesota
v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9 (1933). During much of this same period of time,
however, when a regulatory measure was contested, the Court spoke of the
Cooley doctrine of the division of power over interstate commerce into those
subjects national in character, which could only be regulated by Congress
and those local in character admitting of state regulation. Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1890); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399-400
(1913) ; California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113 (1941). The Court either
used the dual standard of constitutional doctrine as suggested-applying
the Cooley doctrine to regulatory measures and the "exclusive power" doc-
trine to tax measures-or else the Court reversed its field quite frequently,
sometimes even in the same term of Court. See e.g., Lyng v. Michigan,
supra, (tax statute) and Leisy v. Hardin, supra, (regulatory measure).
21. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1946), made it emphatically
clear that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all. California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949) and Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas
Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186 (1950) just as unequivocally declare that the Cooley
doctrine of "concurrent power" is the gauge by which the validity of a
regulatory measure is determined.
22. 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
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movement of commodities in interstate channels. Commerce
clause protection has forbidden taxes levied on the privilege of
engaging in that commerce,23 taxes levied on gross proceeds from
the commerce, 24 and, with the exception of property taxes, it has,
until late years, insulated from taxes the means and instrumen-
talities employed in connection with that commerce.25 Moreover,
taxes which are aimed at or discriminate against interstate com-
merce fall before the commerce clause.2 6
23. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Ozark PipeLine Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925). See Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co.
v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1903) for a large collection of early
cases on this point.
24. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Matson Navigation Co. v.State Board of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441 (1936) ; Philadelphia & SouthernS.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887). Taxes on "net" incomehave withstood an attack on commerce clause grounds. Memphis NaturalGas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942); Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 311 U.S. 452 (1940); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daughton, 262U.S. 413 (1923); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113(1920).
25. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929); Ozark PipeLine Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925). Whatever the particular form
of a tax levied on the means and instrumentalities, if the Court concluded
that it was essentially only local property taxation, it would not be struckdown as an infringement of the commerce clause. E.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry.
v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Audi-
tor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Attorney General ofMassachusetts, 125 U.S. 530 (1888). The Court will now sustain a privilege
tax on the means and instrumentalities of commerce in addition to an
ad valorem property tax. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80(1948); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604(1938).
26. One means of discrimination that became widespread at a fairly
early date was that of exempting from the tax in question the local goods
or events, thus leaving only interstate business subject to the tax. TheCourt made short work of such taxes. Darnell & Son v. Memphis, 208 U.S.113 (1908); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886); Webber v. Virginia,
103 U.S. 344 (1880); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123 (1880); Welton v.Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875). Another form of discrimination equally ob-
noxius from the standpoint of the commerce clause is that of subjecting
non-resident business to higher tax rates than local business. Memphis
Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Ward v. Mary-land, 12 Wall. 418 (U.S. 1870). A party complaining of a tax does not,however, establish discrimination merely by showing that the tax to which
he is subjected is different in form, or adopts a different method of assess-
ment, or that he is subject to a greater number of taxes than is a taxpayer
doing wholly a local business. A tax does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce if other related taxes impose equal burdens on local com-
merce. To show discrimination the complaining taxpayer is under the neces-
sity of showing that in actual practice the tax complained of falls withdisproportionate economic weight on him. See Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co., 300 U.S. 577, 584-85 (1937); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S.472, 480 (1932); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 251(1928).
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There is some reason to think that the Court has occasionally
felt that the commerce clause places a limitation on the amount
of an otherwise valid tax. A few of the capital stock franchise
tax cases rather clearly made the pivotal point of constitution-
ality the smallness in the amount of the tax. When the statute
was revised, increasing the amount, it was upset. 27 Though taxes
for the use of public facilities are limited by the commerce clause
to a reasonable rental, they are not true revenue measures and
would not, of course, support the proposition that the commerce
clause limits the amount of a tax.28 The Court generally has tried
to adhere to the idea that the commerce clause does not place a
limit on the amount of a tax.",
Prior to 1938, when the Court was declaring that interstate
commerce was exempt from local taxation, a tax was saved by
declaring that the effect of the tax on interstate commerce was
"indirect," which is a fashion in judicial speech tantamount to
the conclusion that the taxed event was not considered interstate
commerce.30 A tax levied on the actual movement of interstate
commerce, or on the privilege of engaging in, or on gross receipts
from that commerce, or on the means and instrumentalities used
in interstate commerce (property taxes permitted) was struck
down as having a "direct" effect or being a "direct" burden upon
the commerce, which was another way of saying that there is no
local power to tax interstate commerce.3' The vice of the con-
demned tax was not its potentialities for interfering with the
commerce, but its "direct" bearing on the commerce, whatever
that meant. That brand of doctrinal declaration, of course, as-
27. A Massachusetts capital stock franchise tax with a maximum limit
imposed for the privilege of doing business was sanctioned in Baltic Mining
Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68 (1913). The same tax statute with the
limitation removed was upset in International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts,
246 U.S. 135 (1918). The International Paper opinion points out that the
maximum placed on the amount of the Baltic case tax was a "material
factor" in that decision.
28. Ingles v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937); Interstate Transit, Inc., v.
Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931); see Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339
U.S. 542, 545 (1950).
29. See dissent of Justices Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo in Great North-
ern Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 157 (1936); see Helson and Randolph v.
Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 250 (1929).
30. See Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169, 175 (1935); Ozark
Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 563 (1925); Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1919).
31. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252 (1929); Lyng
v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161, 166 (1890); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S.
640, 648 (1888).
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sumed a trustworthiness in the test which did not exist. It gave
very little help to the legislator, the lower courts or the taxpaying
business men in -predicting whether a particular tax would be
valid. This test simply implied the impotence of state power; it
described a result reached, not the reasons for that result.
Decisions of the magnitude of the constitutionality of a tax
should not be made by resort to labels or virtually meaningless
formulas. As Justice Cardozo once put it "a great principle of
constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive statement
in an adjective. 13 2 Justice Stone, however, was apparently one
of the first members of the Court to spearhead an assault on the
"direct-indirect" effects and burdens test in his dissent in Di
Santo v. Pennsylvania in 1927.33 This test, declared Justice Stone,
is "too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote
from actualities to be of value," and to employ it was "little more
than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
formula by which it [was] reached."' 4
After an interlude of about eight years beginning in 1938 un-
der Justice Stone, during most of which time sounder constitu-
tional doctrines prevailed, 3 an unrealistic approach again re-
appeared and unreliable tests of taxability, similar to the pre-
1938 ones, again crept into the opinions. 3r
During much of our constitutional history, the Court has been
overzealous in protecting interstate commerce from state taxa-
tion. The protection often has been given at the expense of local
interests without being needed for preservation of the national
interests involved. When the Court has adopted the view that
interstate commerce is exempt from local taxation, it has seemed
impervious to the fact that to the extent it granted preferential
tax treatment to interstate business, it thereby placed taxable
local business at a competitive disadvantage with interstate busi-
ness. There have been a few occasions, fortunately, when more
realistic views prevailed and there has been judicial awareness
that curtailment of state taxing power "would be to make local in-
32. Dissenting in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936).
33. 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
34. Id. at 44.
35. Presently we will have something to say about Justice Stone's efforts
along this line.
36. This regrettable recrudescence will be mentioned in some detail a
bit later. See text supported by notes 71, 72, 73, 74, 75 infra.
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dustry suffer a competitive disadvantage." 37 Unfortunately, this
wholesome philosophy has found its way into the decisions at
intervals that have been entirely too infrequent.
Likewise, when the Court adhered to the view that interstate
commerce is free from local taxation, it has failed to show suffi-
cient concern with the essential fairness that those engaged in
interstate commerce should pay an appropriate share to the local
governments under whose protection they operate. Too few have
been the times when the Court has recognized that it "is impor-
tant to prevent that clause [commerce] being used to deprive the
states of their lifeblood .... "Is
Implicit in some of the cases is a concern for local revenue
needs. When valuing property used in connection with interstate
commerce or when valuing local activity for the purpose of state
taxation, the Court has approved a valuation of the property,
activities or events in their organic interstate relations and not
merely as an aggregation of unrelated items. The taxing author-
ity has been permitted to look beyond its territorial borders to
determine the true value of taxed subjects within its borders
when the subjects are part of a multi-state system. The law
values property, activities and events within a taxing jurisdic-
tion according to their nature and in the light of the advantage
of those activities and events, considered not as unrelated items
but in their setting as integral parts of the much larger multi-
state organization. 9 The Court has thus permitted the taxed
valuation of the property, activities and events to take account
of their increase in value resulting from their relation to the
extra-state operations of the taxpayer. To that extent interstate
commerce could fairly be said to be contributing a share for the
37. International Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349
(1944) (per Justice Douglas).
38. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Superior Oil Co. v. Missis-
sippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395 (1930).
39. This is known as the "unit rule" of valuation. This rule was orig-
inally developed to apportion property or earnings of such unitary enter-
prises as communication or transportation companies. E.g., St. Louis, S.W.
Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gottlieb,
190 U.S. 412 (1903). Those, of course, are companies whose property does
have real tangible value above its physical worth owing to its use as part of
one enterprise, and whose earnings are incapable of separation into the
respective portions derived from intrastate and interstate business. This
"unit rule" has been extended to corporations engaged in production and
selling activities. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947) ;
Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939); Great A. & P. Tea
Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
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maintainance of the local governments. Unfortunately, at the
same time the Court was being unrealistic in the matter by in-
sisting that interstate commerce could not be taxed at all. Thus,
there was considerable substance in the observation that the
"[s] tates can tax interstate commerce if they go about it in the
right way.
40
Also, apparently with an eye to the essential fairness that in-
terstate commerce should bear its share of the tax load, the Court
has permitted the local governments to single out various "local"
events closely related to interstate commerce as the incidence of
valid taxes. The various sorts of exactions for the privilege of
employment of articles, such as installation, maintainance of pipe
lines in the ground,.use, storage, withdrawal and other consump-
tion taxes levied on a great variety of activities and privileges
are among sanctioned taxes of this variety.41 But they are never
regarded as taxes on the privilege of engaging in interstate com-
merce, irrespective of the fact that the event taxed is indispen-
sable to an interstate operation. By and large, the legislative
phraseology made the difference. 42 The incidence of the tax is
considered a "local" activity or event. One might well question,
as a certain member of the present Court has done by way of
trenchant dissent, whether there is any "reasonable warrant for
cloaking a purely verbal standard with constitutional dignity. 4 3
Unfortunately, no trustworthy criterion for determining what
events can be segregated so as to serve as the fulcrum of the tax
has been forthcoming from the Court. Oftimes the distinctions
seem arbitrary. 44 The conclusion that the tax is levied on a "local"
40. Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over State
Taxation, 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 773, 774 (1928).
41. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) (mainte-
nance of pipe lines); Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939)(installation of railroad equipment); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace,
288 U.S. 249 (1933) (storage and withdrawal of gasoline).
42. In Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925), the tax-
paying corporation maintained in the taxing state offices, telephone and
telegraph lines, automobiles, and it purchased supplies and employed labor.
Yet the privilege tax was struck down because the legislative phraseology
permitted the tax to be treated as one for the privilege of engaging in inter-
state business. In a later case the Court pointed out that in-the-state activ-
ities of the Ozark Corporation could be subject to a privilege tax. See
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 94 (1948).
43. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 614 (1951)
(dissenting opinion of Justice Clark).
44. In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932), the Court
treated as a taxable local event the generation of electricity for out-of-state
transmission, although the production and transmission processes were
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event gave guidance that is no more reliable or meaningful than
the "direct-indirect" burdens test.
A lesson in statutory draftsmanship can be learned here, how-
ever. The drafters of the tax statute can often achieve tax valid-
ity by phrasing the tax in such terms that it bears on one or more
of these so-called local events, rather than casting it in terms
which will more easily permit the Court to treat it as a tax on
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
While the Court has given some recognition that interstate
commerce should accommodate itself to the revenue needs of the
state as well as to the fairness that local business should not suf-
fer tax disadvantages, there still remain large areas where in-
equities do exist-areas in which the Court has permitted inter-
state business to escape its fair share of the tax load. A tax
levied on items in transit45 or a tax thought to have as its opera-
tive incidence the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce
has never been able to get past the commerce clause roadblock,
even though the tax in each instance was fairly measured accord-
ing to the connections of the objecting taxpayer with the taxing
State.46 To this day the "constitutional infirmity of such a tax
persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned to business done
within the state." 7 The fact that the taxing state afforded op-
portunities to the commerce has not been grist which the Court
has thrown into the constitutional hopper. Thus, taxes measured
by income, whether net or gross, capital stock, or in other ways,
have uniformly been nullified where the Court felt that the sub-
ject of the tax was the privilege of engaging in interstate com-
merce. Such taxes have been banned "without regard to measure
or amount."1 8
In no other instance is the singularly mechanical nature of the
virtually simultaneous. In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
U.S. 250 (1938), the activity of advertising in a magazine with an inter-
state circulation was considered a taxable local event. But in Fisher's
Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) the activity of
advertising by radio was treated as interstate commerce and the tax was
nullified.
45. Hughes Brothers Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926);
Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922).
46. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933);
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Ozark
Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925).
47. Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951).
48. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 217
(1925).
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Court's approach in handling tax litigation more conspicuously
demonstrated than in taxes involving gross receipts from inter-
state operations. In determining the validity of the gross receipts
tax, generally the legislative description of the tax has had a good
deal more to do than the economic effects of the tax or the local
revenue needs. That was particularly true prior to 1938 and
again beginning in 1946. Thus, taxes levied "on" a subject and
"measured by" the gross proceeds from an interstate sale of the
subject matter were more likely to be treated as fairly valuing a
"local" event with only a remote or indirect effect on the com-
merce itself than if the taxes were levied directly "on" the gross
receipts from the transaction. Taxes levied on an event which
the Court considered as "local" and measured by the gross re-
ceipts were unscathed by the commerce clause.49 Prior to 1938
when the legislature aimed the tax directly at the proceeds from
the interstate transaction, there was thought to be much more
likelihood that the tax would cause injurious interference with
the commerce than when the gross proceeds derived from the
transaction were used as a measure of the value of the local
event. When the tax was imposed on gross receipts from multi-
state transactions as the subject, it had great difficulty in getting
across the commerce clause hurdle. 0 Perhaps the Court felt that
there was more danger of reaching proceeds from out-of-state
values, when the tax was levied "on" the proceeds of the transac-
tion, although the Court generally struck down the tax on some
artificial and formalistic ground which obscured whatever value
was preserved by its decision.
From the viewpoint of the economic consequences of the tax,
the distinction drawn by the Court in gross receipts taxes, as well
as in other taxes, has no- useful significance. Thus, while the
Court denied the power of the states to levy a privilege tax "on"
unapportioned gross receipts, nevertheless it was competent to
impose the tax on a local event and measure the value by gross
49. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919); Ficklen v.
Shelby County, 145 U.S. 1 (1892); Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S.
217 (1891). Gross receipts taxes as a fair substitute for all other permis-
sible taxes ("in lieu of") became a familiar and sanctioned tax. Great
Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929); Pullman Co. v. Richard-
son, 261 U.S. 330 (1923); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin,
247 U.S. 132 (1918).
50. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338(1930); Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912).
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proceeds, although a tax measured by the volume of gross re-
ceipts would seem to have, in practical results, the same conse-
quences for suppressing or curtailing the flow of the commerce
as one laid "directly on" the receipts. It is extremely difficult to
get away from the thought that the stuff that will create a trade
barrier, such as the commerce clause was designed to prevent, is
the disproportionate economic weight of a tax on interstate busi-
ness as compared with the tax consequences on local business,
and not some legislative departure from a judicially created
mechanical formula, barren in its economic results. Perhaps no
other tax illustrates better the view that the Court generally has
considered the dominant test of constitutionality to be the sub-
ject taxed rather than economic effects of the tax. The "measure
may be found," says the Court, "in property or in the receipts
from property not in themselves taxable."5'
Sometimes, however, the Court has seen fit to make the mea-
sure of a tax a factor on which constitutionality hinged. This has
occurred occasionally in connection with a tax for the privilege
of doing business when measured by gross receipts,52 and also
when a tax for the privilege of engaging in local business has
been measured by capital stock of the taxpaying foreign corpora-
tion. This exaction is commonly called a corporate franchise tax.
When corporate franchise taxes, measured by the total author-
ized capital stock of the corporation, have been contested, the
Court has adopted a curious technique with respect to the mea-
sure. When this tax has been imposed on a foreign corporation
already engaged in business within the state for the privilege of
doing a local business mingled with its interstate business, it has
been thrust down in several cases as violating both the due
process and the commerce clauses, on reasoning of dubious sound-
ness. The Court has taken the position that, although the tax
was imposed for the privilege of doing local business, neverthe-
less by reason of the fact that the tax was measured by all the
capital stock, it was laid on all of the corporation's property, both
within and without the taxing state.5 3 This, of course, is not true,
51. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 87 (1913).
52. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939). An-
other case where the Court goes far in indicating that a privilege tax is an
infringement of the commerce clause because of the impropriety of gross
receipts as a measure is New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes,
280 U.S. 338 (1930).
53. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929); International
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since there is no necessary relationship between capital stock and
the property of the corporation.54 It is not clear whether the
Court treated the measure of the tax as, in reality, the subject,
or whether it held the tax bad on the ground that the measure
itself transcended commerce and due process limitations. Con-
fusion is added when we notice that capital stock franchise taxes,
measured by the total capital stock of the foreign corporation,
are sustained when the measure is used to determine the price a
state will charge for permitting a foreign corporatoin to enter
the state for the purpose of engaging in local business in the first
instance." There the Court does not question the appropriateness
of the measure. Nor does it question the suitability of the mea-
sure when the total capital stock of a foreign corporation en-
gaged in interstate business is used to determine the amount of
the tax where there is local business separable from the inter-
state business, even though the corporation was engaged in busi-
ness when the levy was imposed 6
The Court likely has treated the legislatively prescribed mea-
sure of the tax as the operating incidence or subject of the tax
in some of the cases where it is indicated that the measure was
the feature that offended commerce clause requirements. 7 The
Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918); Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Kansas e xrel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
54. The actual value of the property of the corporation may be many
times greater than its capital stock, or the value of the property may be
less than the capital stock of the corporation. See 11 FLETOHcER, CORPORA-
TIONS, §§ 5080, 5082 (Perm. ed. 1932), citing a long, unbroken line of
authority supporting this position. The lack of a realistic relationship be-
tween authorized capital stock and the value of the corporation's property
becomes all the more evident in light of the now common practice of having
no-par shares authorized. For evidence that some members of the Court
have recognized that there is no necessary relationship between the author-
ized capital stock of a corporation and its property, see Atlantic Refining
Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22, 28 (1937); Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts,
231 U.S. 68, 87 (1913) (corporation had assets of 5 to 1 of authorized
capital).
55. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937); Horn Silver
Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305 (1892).
56. Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918); Baltic
Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68 (1913).
57. Thus, in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 438(1939), in striking down the tax, the Court said "that the tax, though
nominally imposed upon appellant's possessive activities in Washington, by
the very method of its measurement reaches the entire interstate commerce
service rendered both within and without the state and burdens the com-
merce in direct proportion to its volume." This statement that though the
tax is "nominally imposed" upon taxpayer's business, when followed by the
remainder of the statement, suggests that the Court is using the measure
as a factor in deciding what really is the subject or incidence of the tax.
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measure of a tax (if it is truly a "measure") generally has not
been thought by the Court to raise a constitutional question.
Once the taxing state has based a tax on a taxable subject, that
is the end of the constitutional inquiry in so far as the commerce
clause is concerned. No "constitutional objection lies in the way
of a legislative body prescribing any mode of measurement to
determine the amount it will charge for the privileges it be-
stows." 8
We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that if the legisla-
tures were given a completely free rein in selecting the measure
of a tax, they would be left free to exert their taxing power to
the detriment of the national commerce just as certainly as if
they used an out-of-state value as the subject of the tax, which
they cannot do. There are troublesome problems, therefore, in
connection with the measure of the tax and some control over the
selection of a measure likely is needed. Perhaps that is why the
Court, at times, will conclude that the legislatively designated
measure of a tax is really the subject and will nullify the tax as
having its operating incidence in property or values located be-
yond the jurisdiction of the state or in some integral part of in-
terstate commerce.
The draftsmen of a tax statute can learn a lesson from this
artificial subject-measure concept of taxes. Since the "measure
may be found in property or in the receipts from property not in
themselves taxable," 59 astute draftsmen, by using the proper
formula in regard to the subject and measure of the tax, may be
able to reap a harvest of revenue which would be denied to the
state had the item used as the measure of the tax been used as
the subject.
Even though the legislature has levied the tax "on" an activity
or event that was nominally local and has computed its value by
some innocuous measure, that legislative designation has not al-
ways saved the tax from commerce clause condemnation. Taxa-
bility has not always been achieved by the simple device of cast-
ing the tax in terms of some selected local event. As we have had
occasion to observe, the tax will be held bad if the event taxed is
thought by the Court to be an integral part of interstate com-
58. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 600 (1890). To the same
effect, see Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 87 (1913),
59. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 87 (1913).
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merce or the privilege of engaging in that commerce, even though
the legislature had treated the subject of the tax as a "local"
event. Unfortunately, the Court has never developed any depend-
able guide by which it can be predicted when the Court will disre-
gard the legislative description that the tax is imposed on a local
event. The ascertainment of the scope of the tax is a question for
the state courts and will not be reviewed by the Supreme" Court of
the United States.60 But neither the characterization of the tax by
the legislature nor the state court is determinative of the issue
whether the tax is forbidden by the commere clause. The Su-
preme Court will decide the question whether the legislature or
the state court erroneously classified the taxed event as local
business, when it is interstate business." The taxpayer claiming
immunity supposedly has the burden of establishing his exemp-
tion,62 but the presumption of constitutionality of a tax statute
has been so judicially watered down that many times the com-
plaining taxpayer does not have much trouble in dislodging the
presumption.23
Justice Stone's Di Santo dissent 64 showed his dissatisfaction
with the mechanical approach to the question of tax validity. In
1938, he began to chart a course which would give more consider-
ation to the possible economic effects of the particular tax on
interstate business and less consideration to the formal aspects
of the tax. In resolving the constitutional question, the dominant
concern of Justice Stone was with whether the tax would place
interstate business at a competitive disadvantage with local busi-
ness. The development of this realistic approach began in West-
60. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); Watters V.
Michigan, 248 U.S. 65 (1918); Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U.S. 226(1906) Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U.S. 60 (1905).
61. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948);
Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921).
62. Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
63. In Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), the Court declared that
"any interference" with interstate commerce by way of taxation is repug-
nant to the commerce clause. If this language is taken at face value, the
end product virtually results in a presumption against the validity of a tax
which appears to have an appreciable effect on interstate commerce. A regu-
latory measure is buttressed by a much stronger presumption in favor of
its validity. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440,
444 (1931); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry., 273 U.S. 45, 51(1927).
64. in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927), Justice Stone
stated: "In thus making use of the expressions, 'direct' and 'indirect inter-
ference with commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to de-
scribe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it is reached."
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ern Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue.65 Justice Stone was there
concerned with two main propositions in answering the com-
merce clause question: (1) Interstate comerce should bear its
just share of state tax burdens; (2) state taxes on interstate
commerce should be sustained when not involving danger of
"cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce." The Court
got away from the subject-measure ritual. The major develop-
ment of this wholesome approach took place in the field of taxes
on sales and gross receipts. For a period under Justice Stone's
influence, the Court abandoned the mechanical distinction be-
tween a tax levied "on" gross receipts and taxes imposed on some
,other subject and "measured by" gross receipts. The exaction
would be sustained if the proceeds taxed, whether from sales
transactions or from services, were fairly attributable to activi-
ties and events having a substantial connection with the taxing
state. That was true whether the subject of the tax was some
local event measured by gross proceeds, or whether the tax was
laid directly on gross proceeds as the subject of the tax.66 What-
ever the subject or the legislatively designated measure of the
tax, it would be struck down, however, if it threatened to result
in a heavier tax burden on interstate business than on a local
transaction.6 7 The Court increasingly emphasized the conse-
quence and effects, either actual or threatened, of the questioned
tax to hamper or hinder interstate operations. The emphasis and
stress upon formulae were greatly reduced. A pragmatic ap-
proach to the problem had been adopted and interstate commerce
was required to "pay its way." 6
As the Court, even under Justice Stone, continued to develop
the "cumulative burdens" test, it began to make some modifica-
tions of the doctrine. At times the Court came to speak in terms
of "local" events. Privilege taxes, use taxes and sale taxes on
65. 303 U.S. 250.(1938). There the Court sustained a New Mexico tax
on the business of publishing a magazine having an interstate circulation,
measured by its gross receipts from advertising.
66. International Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340
(1944) ; Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 252 (1941) ; Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Wood Preserv-
ing Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
67. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939);
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
68 Justice Holmes expressed this thought in his famous dissent in New
Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338, 349 (1930)
<dissenting opinion).
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the full proceeds of interstate transactions were upheld on rea-
soning that seemed to seek aid from the pre-1938 doctrine.
There could be no multiplication of a privilege, sales or use tax,
because the tax was on the "local" activity of exercising a privi-
lege or incident to delivery or use within the taxing state. D Thus,
the risk of multiple taxation was not fatal so long as the tax was
peged on an "in-the-state' event or activity, which could not be
the basis of taxation in another state. The tax could not be re-
peated elsewhere.
Although the Court under Justice Stone resorted to the pre-
1938 terminology to aid it in its task, a very significant develop-
ment had taken place. The concept of a taxable "local" event was
very different from the pre-1938 meaning of that terminology.
Under Justice Stone, "local" event was virtually synonomous
with an "in-the-state" event, even though that event was an in-
tegral and indispensable part of an interstate operation. The tax
burden was thus equalized between local and interstate business
by making such "in-the-state" segments of interstate commerce
taxable, so long as the tax did not place interstate commerce at a
competitive disadvantage with local business.
In essence, the use of the term "local" event, even as Justice
Stone employed that term, still stated a conclusion without show-
ing on its face the reasons that led to that conclusion. Neverthe-
less when "local" event is used to mean only that the taxed event
has some factual connection with the taxing state, irrespective of
whether the event is part of interstate or intrastate business,
then that terminology is meaningful and also salutary in that it
permits the states to exact from interstate commerce its fair
share of the tax load with a forthright recognition that such is
being done. Under this definition, it is not necessary for the
Court to engage in mental gymnastics trying to find an event
which is not a part of interstate commerce, which can be used as
a subject for a tax. Factually, of course, it is most difficult, if not
impossible, to find such an event in modern multi-state business.
To be sure, the task of determining whether a particular tax
does give local business a competitive advantage over interstate
business may be difficult, but it should not be any more so than
69. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940)(sales tax); Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939) (use
tax); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938)(tax on privilege of operating engines used to propel gas through pipe line).
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the job of weighing all the varied and complicated factors in ar-
riving at a judgment whether a particular tax discriminates
against interstate commerce. Both jobs appear to be essentially
the same. The Court has always been willing to wrestle with the
problem of tax discrimination. In fact, in Gwin, White & Prince,
Inc. v. Henneford,T the Court concluded that a tax which places
interstate business at a competitive disadvantage with local busi-
ness does discriminate against interstate commerce.
Soon after Chief Justice Stone's death, Freeman v. Hewit7l
marked the end of this brief cycle when practical considerations
were factors influencing constitutionality. Many of the cases
since then have not paid attention to the potentialities or actuali-
ties of the tax for placing interstate commerce at a competitive
disadvantage with local business. Moreover, the present Court
does not seem to concern itself with whether interstate commerce
should pay its way. The Court is again talking in terms of the
freedom of interstate commerce from local taxation.72 The tests
used to determine whether the states have invaded that judicially
established privilege sanctuary are cast, once more, in language
not unlike the mechanical, meaningless language of the pre-1938
cases.1' The Court is again declaring that the states are power-
less to tax unless the tax is laid on a "local" incident and it is
using "local" in a narrow and uncertain meaning, as something
separate and apart from interstate commerce, 74 when factually
such events rarely exist in our modern multi-state business. Even
the "cumulative burdens" test, which was developed to make
interstate commerce pay its way, has been so twisted and tor-
tured that it is now used to express the view that interstate com-
merce is immune from local taxation.75
70. 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
71. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
72. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Norton Co.
v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
73. E.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) (tax invalid because
laid "directly on" and "on the very processes" of interstate commerce).
74. E.g., Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951);
Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.; 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
75. In Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947)
the Court invalidated a tax on gross receipts as applied to stevedoring
because it feared the risk of a "multiple tax burden"; but then the Court
went on to declare that the risk of a multiple burden could not be avoided
since stevedoring was not a "local event" distinct from the commerce.
Clearly, the Court is using the "cumulative burden" test to decide that an
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It is clear that the absence of the risk of tax multiplication
that would place interstate business at a competitive disadvan-
tage with local business is not now enough to sustain a tax
thought to be levied on interstate commerce. Although there is
actually no risk that the tax could be repeated elsewhere, if the
event made the operating incidence of the tax is considered inter-
state commerce, the states are now denied the power of imposing
a tax. It requires but a brief mention of only a few late cases to
establish that proposition. Ready support can be found in Norton
Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois,6 Spector Motor Service, Inc.
v. O'Connor,77 and Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v.
Stone.7 8 In none of these cases was it possible for any other tax-
ing authority to repeat the tax, either in form or in substance.
Yet in each instance the tax was struck down.
This appraisal of local taxation of interstate commerce has
uidertaken to develop two main themes: interstate commerce
should not escape its fair share of taxation, and more attention
should be given economic consequences in determining tax valid-
ity. The writer has tried to emphasize that there are two tre-
mendous, practical policy considerations favoring a narrowing
of the present scope of tax immunity given interstate commerce.
First, locally produced goods that have shouldered a tax must
meet in the local market and compete with goods carried inter-
state. To the extent that tax immunity is given to a taxpayer
whose goods have reached the market by aii interstate journey,
to that extent a preference is granted to interstate commerce.
Thus, the law gives interstate business a competitive advantage
over local business. The purpose of the commerce clause was to
prevent the erection of local barriers against interstate business,
not to give interstate business preferential treatment over local
business. In the second place, interstate commerce should "pay
its way"; it should bear its just and fair share of the tax burdens
of the local governments under whose protection it is carried on.
"It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those
engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state
tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business.""0
event is not taxable unless it is "local," separate and apart from interstate
commerce.
76. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
77. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
78. 342 U.S. 389 (1952) (also nullified because it was discriminatory).
79. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
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At the same time, of course, the states should not be permitted
to utilize their taxing power as an impediment to the country's
economic welfare. There must be a reconciliation of the conflict-
ing demands of the state and national interests. In so doing more
attention should be given to the economic effects of a questioned
tax in determining its validity. That is the stuff out of which
trade barriers are made.
Interstate commerce "receives adequate protection when state
levies are fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory." In those
words Justice Clark of the Supreme Court stated the pith of
the matter in his Spector Motor dissent, ° which upset a tax
on the ground that it was imposed upon the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce, although the tax was fairly based upon
the business connections of the objecting taxpayer with the tax-
ing state. Measuring a tax on interstate commerce according
to the business connections of the taxpayer with the taxing state
satisfies due process and prevents tax multiplication, thus keep-
ing a state from subjecting interstate commerce to an unfair
competitive advantage with local business. Interstate commerce
is entitled to no more; it is not entitled to preferential treatment.
For a short interval under Justice Stone the Court used this
wholesome approach, but a majority of the present Court has
again resurrected the view that interstate commerce cannot be
taxed at all.
To achieve the desired objective two alternate routes are open.
The Court can either abandon its present position of arbitrarily
granting tax immunity; or Congress, by giving consent, can clear
the constitutional path for local taxation. The remainder of this
treatment will be concerned with a congressional solution of the
problem.
B. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The problem of an effective coordination of taxes has become
particularly pronounced in late years. Our state governments are
now confronted with constantly increasing demands that they
shoulder additional functions. That means urgent needs for
added revenue, particularly as prices soar under the pressure of
meting out domestic and foreign military and civilian commit-
See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46 (1940)
to the same effect. Justice Stone was speaking in both cases.
80. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1951).
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ments. It is thus costing the states and their political subdivi-
sions more to do existing jobs, let alone undertake increased jobs.
Consequently, the states are becoming more sensitive about and
jealous of their revenue yields, present and prospective, from
interstate commerce.
On the other hand, the Federal Government is being saddled
with colossal military and civilian expenditure obligations at
home and abroad. Thus, the maintenance of a high rate of eco-
nomic activity with resultant high revenue yield is a grim neces-
sity. Hence it is of vital importance that there be a removal of
barriers to optimum employment and production. The economic
unity of our nation, from which revenue must come, gives im-
pelling reason for insistence against action by one state to gain
commercial advancement at too great cost to sister states and to
the Federal Government. There must be, therefore, a wise ap-
praisal of these conflicting demands of the state and national in-
terests involved.
In view of these tremendously complex and important prob-
lems it is to be wondered whether the process of recourse to the
Court alone for guidance can keep abreast of the present day
dynamic situation that squarely must be faced. A great deal can
be said concerning the practical impossibility of a satisfactory
judicial solution of this problem of maintaining the national in-
terest and at the same time bringing it into an effective harmony
with the local interests-a problem calling for vigilance and reg-
ulation on a national scale. It is to be doubted whether over-all
policies, fair alike to the states and the nation, can be devised
within the framework of the judicial process.
"Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative reg-
ulations-must from inherent limitations of the judicial process
treat the subject by the hit-and-miss method of deciding single
local controversies upon evidence and information limited by the
narrow rules of litigation."'81 Only by "a comprehensive survey
and investigation of the entire national economy-which Con-
gress alone has power and facilities to make"'82 can it be de-
termined whether a tax on interstate commerce is consistent with
the best interests of our national economy. By the same token, it
81. Dissenting opinion of Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas in
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940).
82. Dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v.
Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 449 (1939).
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is only "on the basis of full exploration of the many aspects" of
this complicated problem that Congress alone can "devise a na-
tional policy fair alike to the States and our Union. ' '8 3
There seems little doubt that congressional machinery for in-
vestigation and determination of the effects of state taxes on our
national economy is superior to that of the judiciary and that
Congress has power and facilities to provide a more adequate and
complete remedy than the courts.$4
Thus, because of the inherent limitations on the judicial pro-
cess and because of the past performance of that process, it
seems that recourse to the courts alone to solve this troublesome
fiscal problem does not offer a satisfactory solution. It is sug-
gested that one way to alleviate this problem, in so far as state
taxation of interstate commerce is concerned, is for Congress to
take a hand in the matter. By legislation Congress could give a
declaration as to permissive limits of local taxation by means of
authorization and prohibition of various local taxes. Congress
could consent to taxation of certain phases of interstate com-
merce, and it could curb certain taxing activities, although they
have met constitutional approval. These limitations and authori-
zations would be made, of course, only after a thorough investiga-
tion of the whole problem to determine what kinds of taxes
would be fair alike to the states and the nation. Local and na-
tional interests would thus be balanced in reaching a practical
value judgment as to permissible local taxes on interstate com-
merce. Congress is, after all, the policy making body of our
nation and the duty and power to regulate interstate commerce
has been entrusted by the Constitution to Congress, not to the
courts.
It is fairly certain that Congress does possess the requisite con-
stitutional power for such an undertaking. While there has been
no common agreement on the Court as to whether the impedi-
ment to state action affecting interstate commerce stems from the
commerce clause itself or whether it arises only from the will of
Congress, there has been common agreement that Congress itself
can do something about clearing that obstacle from the path of
83. Dissenting opinion of Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas in
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 189 (1940).
84. See Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 HARV. L.REV. 1253, 1260 (1940) (Mr. Lockhart takes the position that judicial relief
should act as a stop-gap until Congress has acted).
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state action. "It is no longer debatable that Congress, in the
exercise of the commerce power, may authorize the states, in.
specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose bur-
dens upon it."' 85 Into this single sentence from the opinion in
Internationaz Shoe Co. v. Washigton,86 Chief Justice Stone com-
pressed one of the most sweeping and unequivocal declarations to
be found in the Court's opinions on the subject of congressional
consent to state action that otherwise could not withstand the im-
pact of the commerce clause, although he had just as unequivo-
cally declared that the commerce clause of its own force is a
check on state action. 87 Chief Justice Stone's confidence vas
abundantly justified. Congressional permission to states "to reg-
ulate the [interstate] commerce in a manner which would other-
wise not be permissible"88 runs through the whole fabric of con-
stitutional doctrine. It is almost as old as the Constitution itself.
It has many legislative illustrations and has received unbroken
judicial approval.89
The undoubted power of Congress to "redefine the distribution
of power over interstate commerce"90 has found lodgment in the
field of taxation, as well as in regulatory matters. In Interna-
tional Shoe, apparently for the first time, the Court squarely held
that Congress has power to permit the states to levy an otherwise
forbidden tax on interstate commerce. This case involved a state
unemployment tax, and Congress had provided that the employer
85. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326' U.S. 310, 315 (1945). To
the same effect, see California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
86. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
87. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
88. Id. at 769.
89. As early as 1789 Congress enacted a statute which put pilots for
interstate commerce under state law. This pilotage law was sustained in
the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
Some of the best known illustrations of congressional consent to state action
have been in connection with efforts to control interstate liquor traffic. The
first instance of such consent to state control of liquors was upheld in In re
Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). Later Congress enlarged the scope for the
operation of state laws by "divesting" liquors of their interstate commerce
character. This was upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917). Congress likewise "divested" oleomargarine of
its interestate commerce attributes, and the statute was sustained in United
States v. Green, 137 Fed. 179 (N.D.N.Y. 1905). The same pattern of con-
gressional consent to state control was used with respect to convict-made
goods as the taws with regard to intoxicating liquors. The convict-made
goods law was sustained in Whitefield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936), and in
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
90. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769
(1945).
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should not be "relieved from compliance therewith on the ground
that he is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce." 91 So con-
fident was the Court that Congress possessed the power to con-
sent to state taxation that it refused to be detained by the argu-
ment against the power. In sustaining the state unemployment
tax the Court disposed of the argument against it in the single
sentence just quoted from the opinion.
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjaminsi represents the latest
and now perhaps the most conspicuous example of judicial ac-
ceptance of congressional consent to an otherwise prohibited
state tax on interstate commerce. That case involved the validity
of a South Carolina statute imposing a tax on the premiums of
insurance policies written by foreign insurance companies. The
tax statute was supported by an act of Congress giving consent
to taxation. 3 The act had been passed to remove doubts as to the
continued operation of state laws after the Supreme Court de-
cided that the business of insurance is interstate commerce.9 4 The
act of Congress subjecting insurance to state control was at-
tacked in the Prudential case. In sustaining the act, the Court
observed that Congress simply had released state powers held in
restraint by the power of Congress over interstate commerce,
and had thus permitted the states to legislate in a manner pre-
viously forbidden to them.
Not only can Congress expand the limits of the power of the
states to control or affect interstate commerce by means of regu-
latory or tax measures, but Congress also has power to determine
that interstate commerce shall be free from shackles of state ac-
tion, although the particular state action would otherwise be
valid in the absence of the congressional action. In formulating
national policy over the commerce, Congress may sweep away
state action that interferes with congressional policy. In South-
91. 49 STAT. 642 (1935), 26 U.S.C. § 1606 (a) (1946).
92. 328 U.S. 408 (1946). For a recent pronouncement by the courts to
the effect that Congress can authorize the states to tax interstate commerce,
see Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951).
93. The congressional enactment, variously referred to as Public Law
15 or the McCarran Act, was passed on March 9, 1945. It provided, in part,
as follows: "The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regula-
tion or taxation of such business." 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012
(1946).
94. United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 332 U.S. 533(1944).
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ern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sulliva495 Chief Justice Stone
declared that "Congress has undoubted power to redefine the dis-
tribution of power over interstate commerce," and then he signi-
ficantly added that "[i]t may either permit the States to regulate
the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permis-
sible" or "exclude state regulation even of matters of peculiarly
local concern which nevertheless affect interstate commerce." ' ,
It is familiar learning that Congress may, to employ terminology
in accord with some of the Court's opinions, "occupy the field"
which the commerce clause gives Congress power to regulate and
state action in conflict with congressional occupation must go
down. In the exercise of "its plenary power to regulate inter-
state commerce" Congress "may determine whether the burdens
imposed" upon the commere "by state regulation; otherwise per-
missible, are too great, and may, by legislation designed to secure
uniformity or in other respects to protect the national interest in
the commerce, curtail to some extent the state's regulatory
powers."9 ,
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is so "com-
plete and paramount" in character that Congress may supersede
state action even in fields which are admittedly intrastate, where
Congress uses that power as the basis for the affirmative estab-
lishment of national policy over interstate commerce; and where
Congress exercises its power, so as to conflict with state action,
either specifically or by implication, the staite action becomes in-
operative. 9
This doctrine of federal supersession of state action where
Congress has acted in connection with the same subject matter
has found judicial acceptance where the questioned state action
is taxation, as well as regulation. MeGoldick 'v. Gulf Oil Corpo-
ration9 furnishes a good example of the deference the Court will
95. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
96. Id. at 769.
97. Justice Stone in South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 189-90 (1938). For a discussion of develop-
ments of the predomination of congressional power over state power in
fields where Congress has power, see Braden, Umpire to the FederafSystem,
10 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 27 (1942) ; Bickle, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARV.
L. REv. 200 (1927).
98. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); New York
v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922); Houston, E. & V. Texas Ry. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
99. 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
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pay in order to carry out the purpose of congressional legislation
for promoting the national interest in expanded commerce. There
the Court curbed, as an infringement of a congressional regula-
tion of commerce, the tax activities of the City of New York so
that the operations of the "free-port" of Staten Island would not
be impaired by local taxation. The tax in question was nullified,
not because it conflicted with the commerce clause, but because
it was in conflict with the congressional policy expressed through
legislation. o10
The decisions clearly indicate that the hands of Congress are
practically unfettered in regard to preempting control not only
of interstate commerce, but also of subjects in purely local areas
which are interrelated with, or have an appreciable affect upon,
interstate commerce.-' The grant of the commerce power to
Congress is now established as full and complete. The decisions
establish that the "federal commerce power is as broad as the
economic needs of the nation,"'10 2 and that any restraints on the
exercise of the commerce power by Congress "must proceed from
political rather than from judicial processes.' 10 3
There seems no good reason to doubt, therefore, that, under its
power over interstate commerce, Congress can delimit permis-
100. In People of the State of New York v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1882), one reason for striking down the tax law
was that Congress had occupied the field.
101. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) established the compe-
tence of Congress to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber
manufactured by employees whose wages were less than a prescribed mini-
mum, or whose weekly hours of labor were greater than the prescribed max-
imum, and it also established the power of Congress to prohibit the employ-
ment of workmen in the production of goods "for interstate commerce" at
other than prescribed wages and hours. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942), which sanctioned the power of Congress, under the commerce
power, through quotas for marketing, to impose its regulation on a single
farmer with respect to the amount of wheat grown on his farm solely for
consumption there. No element of production of goods for market, either
interstate or intrastate was present. These two cases, of course, gave the
quietus to such cases as Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), and Hammer v. Degenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918). For an elaborate analysis of the power of Congress
to prohibit commerce, written before the fullblown doctrine of the Wicka-d
and Darby cases, see Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce: a
Crucial Constitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L. Q. 477 (1933). For a survey of
the significance of the doctrine of the Wickard and Darby cases, and other
cases of the same period, widening the compass of congressional power, see
Dowling, Constitutional Developments in Five War Years, 32 VA. L. Rgv.
461, 467 et seq. (1946).
102. American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 329
U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
103. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
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sively state taxation of interstate commerce. It can either author-
ize such taxation by the states as Congress deems appropriate, or
it can prohibit various kinds of state taxation, otherwise valid,
when Congress uses its power as the basis for the establishment
of national policy over interstate commerce.1
04
It should be kept in mind, however, that an overall revamping
of tax policies by Congress could entail much more than a solu-
tion of the commerce clause problems of local taxation of inter-
state commerce. Congress likely would be concerned also with
formulating sound fiscal policy, which would envisage the prob-
lems of permitting those taxes thought desirable from the view-
point of national economy and economics, and the prohibition,
perhaps, of some taxes now sustained by the Court, but thought
undesirable from the standpoint of economics and trade. That is
to say, the local interest for revenue might not be commensurate
with the trade barrier consequences of the particular type of tax.
More accurately, the local interest might be outweighed by the
national interest in the unhampered operation of interstate com-
merce. In this connection Congress might see fit to prohibit those
fiat fee privilege taxes which bear no relationship to the volume
of the business done. Thus, privilege or franchise taxes on the
undertaking of a business might be thought undesirable and
taxes on results of business more preferable. Of course, many
franchise or privilege taxes are computed by the volume of busi-
ness actually done by the activity tax and are therefore based
on results, but fiat fees that bear no relation to the fluid basis of
business done might be banned by Congress, although such taxes
have been uiassailable under the commerce clause. Congress
might limit the incidence of any taxes on interstate commerce to
the external manifestations of wealth creation and utilization.
Wealth creation would be the production of raw materials,",; the
104. "Congress, through the commerce clause, possesses the .. . power
of control of state taxation of all merchandise moving in interstate or for-
eign commerce." Chief Justice Stone speaking for the majority in Hooven &
Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 679 (1945).
105. To lessen the competition among the states to become sites for indus-
tries of production, if such check is thought desirable, Congress could levy
a production tax and give credits to the states for taxes which Congress
levies based on similar taxes paid to the states. To insure maximum effec-
tiveness, the credit could be up to 100%. This would enable a state to tax
without fear of losing industries to states giving more favorable tax treat-
ment to production. This device would also induce the states to meet stand-
ards set up by Congress for sound fiscal policy. This device has judicially
sanctioned precedent, especially in the field of unemployment taxes. Stewart
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increase in the value of the raw materials through fabrication, or
the storage of materials. Wealth utilization as occasions for tax-
ation would be concerned with sales to ultimate consumers.
While troublesome problems inevitably would arise in connec-
tion with an "apportionment" formula in order to permit each
state to reach only its fair share of revenue attributable to an
interstate operation, nevertheless such formulae could be worked
out. "Apportionment" formulae were easily conceived and
worked well where miles of trackage or communications lines
were concerned, but the apportionment of proceeds from such
interstate operations as broadcasting appears to present a more
difficult problem. There are. however, formulae that could be
acceptable and equitable, such as location of percentage of popu-
lation served, based on the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's convenience and necessity area allocation. Where the sale
of goods is concerned, there has been a good deal of sentiment
favoring action that would limit the taxation of interstate sales
to the state of the buyer.1°0 By permitting a tax only by the
buyer's state equality of competition between local and out-of-
state goods is preserved. The buyer's state is the place where the
out-of-state goods would enter competition with goods sold locally
and which would be subject to the same sales tax. Thus, the tax
burden would necessarily fall equally on both interstate and local
trade. These are simply suggestive of the type of policy decisions
Congress would find it necessary to make in determining the
appropriate part of an interstate organism which should be taxed
by particular states.
In formulating its fiscal policy, Congress might be more mind-
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). After Congress enacted the
unemployment tax statute, allowing credit to states which enacted unemploy-
ment statutes conforming to congressional standards, there was widespread
enactment of state unemployment tax statutes to meet the federal standards
in order to entitle the taxpayers of the states to the credits allowed byCongress. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Hellerstein and Henne-
feld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HARv. L. RFv. 949, 969(1941); Corwin, National-State Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities, 46
YALE L. J. 599 (1937).
106. This objective could be accomplished either by a federal statute or
by a uniform law adopted by all of the states. The delays encountered in
achieving this objective by state adoption of uniform state laws by all forty-
eight states does not make the "uniform statute" solution seem very prom-
ising, however. For a discussion of both methods of achieving this result
and a proposed uniform law which is set forth in detail as a suggestion,
see Snell, Sales Taxes and Interstate Commerce, 27 TAxEs 37, 47 et seq.(1949).
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ful of the cost of compliance with tax laws by the taxpayer.
Along this line, Congress could consider the wisdom of insulating
interstate transactions from tax levies by political subdivisions
of a state. The smaller, distant interstate competitor undoubtedly
is at a disadvantage in keeping informed as to the tax laws of
political subdivisions of a state. For the larger corporation, keep-
ing abreast of tax measures of distant municipalities is simply
another chore for the staff of lawyers and other specialists al-
ready employed. But in smaller organizations, especially when
sales are spasmodic, there may not be room in the overhead for
such specialists. Moreover, there is not much uniformity in re-
gard to municipal taxes, which is an undesirable feature of tax
law administration. 10 7
The removal of trade barriers consisting of local taxes, al-
though now constitutionally valid, which tend to operate to the
disadvantage of persons, products and business coming from
sister states, to the advantage of local residents, products and
business, appears properly as a problem to be solved by the na-
tional legislature and others who influence and determine legis-
lative policy. 0 8
The power of Congress to displace state action touching inter-
state commerce would seem to afford Congress an ample basis of
power to do the sort of thing herein recommended in the estab-
lishing of a national policy over interstate commerce.
It is not the purpose of the writer to go into any detail tG
recommend what specific taxes on interstate commerce should be
permitted and what should be forbidden. The foregoing sug-
gestions on that facet of the subject are merely illustrative of the
kind of action that Congress might conceivably take in areas
where some action is needed. The types of taxes that should be
107. For a discussion of some of the problems in the imposition of muni-
cipal taxes, see Graubard, Special Problems in the Levy of Municipal Excise
Taxes, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 613 (1941). For a late recommendation
that political subdivisions should refrain from imposing net or gross income
taxes and general sales taxes, see report of the Joint Committee of the
American Bar Association, the National Tax Association and the National
Association of Tax Administrators, THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL, STATIl
AND LOCAL TAXATION 83, 97 (1947).
108. For a comprehensive discussion of taxes of this nature, see a report
of the U.S. Treasury Department's Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal
Relations, FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FIscAL RELATIONS, SEN.
Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1943). This Committee favors a
closer coordination of local and federal agencies as a solution to the problem.
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permitted or forbidden is a judgment which can properly be
made only after Congress has all the facts at hand resulting from
competent research and investigation. It would be presumptuous
of the writer to undertake to make that value judgment before
Congress has made the investigation.
If Congress should, as it constitutionally may, enact a statute
permitting the states to impose non-discriminatory and reason-
able taxes on certain phases of interstate commerce and, perhaps,
forbidding certain types of taxes, there seem to be two alterna-
tive forms of action which could be taken to achieve these objec-
tions: (a) broad legislation (Sherman Act type) with the de-
tailed enforcement of the act left to the courts; (b) a detailed act
(Interstate Commerce Act or a Code type). It might be neces-
sary to establish an administrative agency for the proper imple-
mentation of this last type of statute. Or, the "code" might be
worked out in such detail that it could be administered directly
by the courts without a catalytic administrative agency inter-
vening."'
From the drafting point of view there exists a certain amount
of legislative history that should be helpful. If state taxation
without any curbs is desired, the federal statute removing the
commerce clause impediment from state unemployment taxes
would furnish a guide. It is a very short, simply-worded, clear
statute, which reads:
No person required under a State law to make payments
to an unemployment fund shall be relieved from compliance
therewith on the ground that he is engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce, or that the State law does not distinguish
between employees engaged in interstate or foreign com-
merce and those engaged in intrastate commerce."10
109. Both (a) and (b) type alternative forms of action by Congress have
been suggested. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Re-
rised Version, 47 COL. L. REV. 547, 558 (1947). See Powell. More Ado About
Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARv. L. REV. 501, 532 (1947). Others have pro-
posed the creation of a Federal-State Fiscal Authority to work out better
fiscal relations. See report of the U.S. Treasury Department's Committee
on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT FISCAL RELATIONS, SEN. Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-45(1943). On this same matter see report of the Joint Committee of the
American Bar Association, the National Tax Association and Association
of Tax Administrators, THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION 103 (1947).
110. 53 STAT. 187 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1946).
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Likewise, the McCarran Act which subjects the business of in-
surance to state regulation and taxation is simplicity personified.
It provides, in part:
The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.' 1 '
While both the unemployment tax statute and the McCarran
Act have been judicially approved, a tax statute patterned after
either of them would probably not prevent taxes that are dis-
criminatory or taxes that otherwise unreasonably interfere with
the commerce. State taxation of national bank shares has a
closer relevancy to the problem at hand. Federal statutes per-
mitting taxes on national bank shares have been enacted 12 and
reenacted revisedly"13 into federal legislation. The technique re-
sorted to was to set aside to a limited degree the tax immunity
granted to national banks in McCullock v. Maryland,"4 and
further to protect the national banks from discriminatory taxes
favoring local financial institutions with which they might com-
pete. No effort was made to place quantitative ceilings on the
state tax. To prevent discriminatory state taxation of the na-
tional bank shares, the permission to tax is embellished with a
provision that the shares should not be taxed at a greater rate
than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of in-
dividual citizens of the taxing state coming into competition with
the business of national banks, and to prevent the "multiple
risk" of taxation, it provides that the shares of any national
banking association owned by non-residents of any state shall be
taxed in the city or town where the bank is located, and not else-
where.115 Of course, in one respect the taxation of interstate com-
merce presents a problem not so often found in connection with
the taxation of bank shares. Items of commerce are migratory
and are exposed in this manner to a greater risk of multiple tax-
ation than bank shares. A tax statute modeled after the National
111. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1946).
112. 13 STAT. 112 (1864).
113. 44 STAT. 223 (1926), 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1946).
114. 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
115. The statute of 1864 was sustained by the Court in Van Allen v.
The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573 (U.S. 1865). For a late case where the Court
dealt with congressional consent to state taxation of national banks, see
Tradesmens National Bank of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 309
U.S. 560 (1940).
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Bank Shares Act would fall under the broad "Sherman Act" type
of legislation, which is one of the alternatives already set forth.
The detailed enforcement of the act could be left to the courts.
At least one bill has been introduced into Congress for the pur-
pose of regulating taxation of interstate commerce. That is the
Harrison Bill.16 While it would permit some taxation of inter-
state commerce, one of its purposes is also that of cutting down,
in some respects, taxation now valid. The Bill reads:
Be it enacted, etc., That all taxes or excises levied by any
State upon sales of tangible personal property, or measured
by sales of tangible personal property, may be levied upon, or
measured by, sales of like property in interstate commerce,
by the State into which the property is moved for use or con-
sumption therein, in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent, that said taxes or excises are levied upon or measured
by sales of like property not in interstate commerce and no
such property shall be exempt from such taxation by reason
of being introduced into any State or Territory in original
packages, or containers, or otherwise: Provided, That no
State shall discriminate against sales of tangible personal
property in interstate commerce, nor shall any State discrim-
inate against the sale of products of any other States: Pro-
vided further, That no State shall levy any tax or excise
upon, or measured by, sales in interstate commerce of tan-
gible personal property transported for the purpose of resale
by the consignee: Provided further, That no political sub-
division of any State shall levy a tax or excise upon, or mea-
sured by, sale of tangible personal property in interstate
commerce. For the purposes of this act a sale of tangible
personal property transported, or to be transported, in inter-
state commerce shall be considered as made within the State
into which such property is to be transported for use or con-
sumption therein, whenever such sale is made, solicited, or
negotiated in whole or in part within that State."17
This bill would have cleared the path for state taxation of in-
terstate transactions saving only: first, no discrimination against
out-of-state and interstate products, by permitting the interstate
products to be taxed only if a similar tax is applied to intrastate
products; second, the state could not subject to tax items in-
tended for resale by consignees; third, interstate transactions
are immunized from tax levies by political subdivisions of states.
The Harrison Bill, like the National Bank Shares Act, would fall
116. S. 2897, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 78 CONG. REC. 4597 (1934).
117. Ibid.
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within the broad "Sherman Act" type of legislation as previously
discussed. The Harrison Bill does not appear, however, to have
as an objective the prevention of tax duplication to the same ex-
tent as the National Bank Shares Act. Thus, any legislation
adopted by Congress, if it was thought wise economically, could
incorporate a provision taking care of the tax duplication con-
cerning interstate transactions.
By resorting to the double-barrelled legislative devise of per-
mitting a state tax on interstate commerce "only if" a similar
tax is applied to intrastate items, like the Harrison Bill and the
National Bank Shares Act, and further by prohibiting any other
than the congressionally permitted modes of taxing interstate
commerce, the states could be influenced into adapting their own
intrastate tax policies to conform to interstate standards. The
alternative to non-conformance by the states would be that the
intrastate transaction would bear the heavier tax load-for, in
order to tap interstate sources of revenues, the intrastate trans-
action would have to be subjected to identical tax scales, and, of
course, would bear any additional tax burdens that existed within
the state.
Recourse to Congress, rather than to the courts alone, for
guidance in solving the problem of state taxation of interstate
commerce in our economy that is national in scope is worth con-
sidering in view of the tremendous needs for high revenue yields
by Congress as well as by the states. While there is a most press-
ing need for the removal of local tax barriers to optimum em-
ploynent and production which will produce that needed revenue,
at the same time there exists a conflicting need for local revenue.
These two great conflicting demands hardly admit of an abso-
lutely logical solution. They call for a wise adjustment; and Con-
gress has better machinery for making that adjustment than the
courts.
This approach to the problem would provide flexibility in the
adjustment and accommodation of national and local interests,
and at the same time it would preserve the judicial and amplify
the legislative function. From the judicial point of view it would
preserve to the Court the role of determining whether the local
tax measures were in harmony with congressional policy. From
the legislative viewpoint, the fullest power of Congress would be
guaranteed. In no event could the Court forestall or obstruct
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congressional action. If the judicial decision with respect to a
particular state law was not in harmony with the will of Con-
gress, it could step in and take corrective action.
Affirmative congressional control over state taxing activities
would entail no sharp break with precedent, and its exercise
would be in line with some of the best efforts of the Court during
the past hundred years. It is a significant doctrine, too, making
for flexibility in the adjustment and accommodation of national
and state interests, which is one of the finest phases of our fed-
eral system. This doctrine gives fullest scope to the power dele-
gated to the national government for dealing with the entire, tre-
mendously important problem of commercial and fiscal relations
among the states. It recognizes that in the exercise of its power
over commerce, Congress, by legislating for the nation as a
whole, may formulate its own policies to promote national eco-
nomic unity, or it may so devise its actions as to enable the states
to effectuate their own policies through their own laws. By the
exercise of this plenary power to protect national interests Con-
gress may clear away hobbling tax restrictions which the states
might otherwise impose upon the national interests in expanded
commerce, even though the state tax may be of such nature that
it might otherwise be upheld by the Court. Congress, the policy
making body of our government, is thus entrusted with the com-
merce power "as broad as the economic needs of the nation" by
which to preserve and promote the national interest in commerce
among the states and at the same time bring that interest into an
effective harmony with local interests and the principles of local
government.
Washington University Open Scholarship
